We develop a theory and present empirical evidence from a real trading environment on a mechanism through which investor confidence leads to trading. More confident investors rely more on intuitive judgments when forming beliefs about expected returns. In particular, they rely more on naïve reinforcement learning and extrapolate recent individual return experiences into the future more strongly. Because such return experiences are volatile, more confident investors change their beliefs more strongly, and thus have more reason to trade. 3
Introduction
It is a well-established finding that investors who are more confident trade more than investors who are less confident (see e.g., Barber and Odean 2001; Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink 2006; Glaser and Weber 2007; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009) . However, why do confident investors trade so much? This is an important question, as overtrading leads to underperformance through the accumulation of transaction costs (Barber and Odean 2000) .
The mechanism through which investor confidence results in more trading, however, remains unclear to date. We contribute to the literature by developing a theory and presenting empirical evidence on such a mechanism through which investor confidence leads to trading.
Typical explanations for the positive relationship between investor confidence and trading rely on theoretical models about how investors process and interpret information signals about firm fundamentals. More confident investors, for example, would believe more strongly in their private signals and/or overweight these signals when updating their beliefs (Odean 1998) . The resulting divergence of opinion is hypothesized to lead to more trading by providing more reasons to trade. Generally, more confident investors are assumed to be more willing to act on their personal beliefs (Graham, Harvey, and Huang 2009; Deaves, Lüders, and Luo 2009 ). The present literature, however, typically assumes rather than empirically examines the mechanisms through which investor confidence translates into more trading.
That is, so far the literature tests the ultimate relation between confidence and trading, but does not examine the intermediate stages explaining why confidence leads to trading.
Indeed, some of the assumed mechanisms on how confidence relates to trading appear ambiguous. For example, while the willingness to act on strong beliefs is expected to lead to (more) trading (Graham, Harvey, and Huang 2009) , the opposite might be true as well. To elaborate, investors with strong beliefs might trade less, because those strong beliefs lead them to be less impacted by (or even be ignorant about) any new information they receive.
Moreover, existing models assume that investors possess relatively advanced informationprocessing capabilities and look primarily for signals on fundamental values. As a result, these models may be related only distantly to the reason why individual investors trade so often in reality. Indeed, Cochrane (2013: 44) states that " [m] odels in which an informed trader possesses a 'signal' about the value of a liquidating dividend just don't describe the vast majority of trading. […] [M]ost […] traders […] look at patterns of prices, volumes, and past trading activity, not 'information' or opinion about firm fundamentals."
We complement previous literature about the impact of investor confidence on trading behavior by developing a theoretical framework of investor belief formation and behavior in which investors-to varying degrees, depending on their confidence-take into account past prices (i.e., individual investment returns) when forming their expectations about future returns and subsequently trade based on those expectations. To conduct an empirical test of the predictions derived from our framework, we use a unique panel dataset that combines monthly survey data on investor expectations and confidence with matched trading records.
We find that investors who are more confident about their investment beliefs (return expectations) display greater month-to-month updates in these beliefs. More confident investors thus change their opinions more strongly, and these changes lead to trading. Our results also show why confident investors change their opinions more strongly than less confident investors. Confidence relates to reliance on intuition and is associated with the use of cognitive shortcuts and heuristics. We find that more confident investors rely more on naïve reinforcement learning with respect to their return experiences. These investors extrapolate their recent return experiences into beliefs about future returns more strongly.
Because such return experiences are volatile, more confident investors change their opinions more strongly, providing these investors with more reason to trade than less confident ones.
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses
Our theoretical framework consists of four components: investor experiences, confidence, beliefs, and behavior ( Figure 1 ). Investor experiences comprise individual-level past portfolio returns. In our framework, investors first observe their returns. Subsequently, based on these return experiences, investors form beliefs. That is, they update their return expectations.
When updating their beliefs, investors extrapolate recent return experiences. That is, they rely on naïve reinforcement learning (also named the extrapolation heuristic (Chen et al. 2007 ; Kaustia and Knüpfer 2008; Choi et al. 2009; Chiang et al. 2012) ). Finally, investors trade on their updated beliefs. Confidence enters the framework at the stage of belief formation.
Investors' confidence level interacts with their interpretation of return experiences in that it leads them to rely more or less on naïve reinforcement learning when updating their beliefs.
[ Figure 1 here] Our theoretical framework is consistent with well-established findings from prior literature, while extending this literature by including the "experience-confidence-belief" intermediate link. Dominitz and Manski (2011) , Malmendier and Nagel (2011) , Greenwood and Shleifer (2013) , and Hoffmann and Post (2012) find that return expectations depend on experienced returns. Consistent with naïve reinforcement learning, these studies find that recent experiences are extrapolated to expectations about future returns. That is, good past returns lead investors to form more optimistic expectations about future returns (and vice versa).
Combining trading records and matching survey data on beliefs, Hoffmann et al. (2013a; 2013b) and Weber, Weber, and Nosic (2013) find direct evidence that updates in investor beliefs drive trading behavior.
Investor confidence is an important element in many theoretical models of investor beliefs and behavior. In Odean's (1998) seminal model, for example, investors receive (private) signals about a risky asset's fundamental value (which in our framework corresponds to individual-level information about past returns). In Odean's (1998) model, confident investors perceive a too-small variance of the signal when forming their beliefs, and thus have a different opinion on the attractiveness of the asset than less confident investors or investors not having received the signal. The resulting divergence in opinion provides reason to trade (Varian 1989; Harris and Raviv 1993; Banerjee 2011) . Although investor confidence forms an important part of Odean's (1998) model, as well as related ones (see e.g., Kyle and Wang 1997; Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998; Benos 1998; Caballé and Sákovics 2003) , its precise role is not tested empirically.
Furthermore, it is not evident whether the aforementioned mechanism through which investor confidence impacts trading behavior is an accurate description of reality. Numerous papers test the direct link between investor confidence and trading behavior (see e.g., Barber and Odean 2001; Statman, Thorley, and Vorkink 2006; Glaser and Weber 2007; Grinblatt and Keloharju 2009; Deaves, Lüders, and Luo 2009 ), but do not examine the underlying mechanism.
1 Moreover, recent studies doubt the realism of the mechanism linking investor confidence to trading behavior, as proposed by models such as that of Odean (1998) . First, the average individual investor does not seem to possess private information about the fundamental value of assets (Coval, Hirshleifer, and Shumway 2005; Kaniel, Saar, and Titman 2008; Seasholes and Shu 2010; Døskeland and Hvide 2011) . Second, individual investors may not look primarily at information about firm fundamentals, but instead at 1 Based on the empirical result that, on average, individual investors accept negative returns on their trades (after considering potential trades for liquidity demands, tax-loss selling, portfolio rebalancing, move to lower-risk securities), Odean (1999) concludes that such trading behavior is consistent with overconfidence. Such behavior, however, may also be consistent with alternative trading motivations, such as trading for entertainment (Dorn and Sengmueller 2009). patterns of past prices (see Cochrane 2013: 44) , which is consistent with the naïve reinforcement learning of individual investors documented in the aforementioned literature.
Our framework complements previous theories about the impact of investor confidence on trading behavior and acknowledges the aforementioned doubts by incorporating signals that are easy for individual investors to observe and process. In particular, we use investor return experiences (past prices) as the trigger for belief formation. Our framework allows us to test empirically the mechanism through which investor confidence impacts belief formation. In our framework, investors update their beliefs (return expectations) by extrapolating recent return experiences. We propose that investor confidence is positively related to the strength of such naïve reinforcement learning. That is, given the same past return, more confident investors will extrapolate their return experiences to a greater extent.
In our framework, investor confidence relates to the notion of confidence, as described in Kahneman (2011: 212, 217 2 Evans (2003; 2008) , Kahneman (2003) , and Stanovich and West (2000) discuss Dual Process Theory in detail.
Prior research documents that individuals who base their judgments primarily on intuition tend to use more cognitive shortcuts and heuristics (Stanovich and West 2000; Evans 2003; Evans 2008 (Varian 1989; Harris and Raviv 1993; Banerjee 2011) . Ultimately, as confident investors have more reason to trade, they trade more than less confident ones. That is, we expect:
Investors who change their return expectations more strongly have higher turnover.
Data
We base our analyses on a dataset also used in Hoffmann and Post (2012) and Hoffmann et al. (2013a; 2013b Kaplanski et al. 2013) . Because these investors do not receive advice from the discount broker, the investment transactions and survey responses reflect their own decisions and opinions. As in Hoffmann et al. (2013a; 2013b) , we exclude accounts of minors (< 18 years) and of those with an average portfolio value of less than €250, as well as accounts in the top 1% of annual trading volume, transaction frequency, or turnover distributions, leaving 1,376 accounts for analysis.
Brokerage Records
We have brokerage records of investors who completed at least one survey during the sample period. Apart from transaction information, the records contain information on investors' portfolio balances, demographics such as age and gender, and their six-digit postal code.
Using data from Statistics Netherlands, we use this postal code to assign income and residential house value to each investor.
3 Table 1 defines all variables. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of all brokerage accounts available, and those for the subset of accounts of clients who completed the survey in each particular month of the sample period.
3 Home-ownership rates in the Netherlands are high (67.5%, as of 2008 (Eurostat 2011) ) and skewed toward wealthier households (Rouwendal 2007) , making it likely that the assigned house values correspond closely to the value of the houses actually owned by investors in the sample. Postal codes are unique to each street or even parts of a street in the Netherlands.
[ Tables 1 and 2 here] A comparison with samples of discount brokerage clients used in other studies of investor behavior in the United States (Barber and Odean 2000; Barber and Odean 2002) shows that this study's sample of investors is similar in terms of age and gender, portfolio size, and turnover. Moreover, according to a report on Dutch retail investors by Millward-Brown (2006) , the account values comprise the major share of investors' total self-managed wealth.
As capital gains are not taxed in the Netherlands, tax-loss-selling plays no role in the sample. Dorn and Sengmueller 2009) . A possible concern is that the monthly variation in response rate (Table   2) is not random. To examine this notion, Hoffmann et al. (2013b) perform an analysis of the monthly variation in response rate and compare the investors who complete the survey to the broker's overall investor population. These comparisons show that the sample is not subject to non-random response problems. Another potential concern is response timing affecting the results. Beliefs and confidence of early versus late respondents might differ, because of changes in individual portfolio returns between their response times. As most responses are received within the first few days after we send each survey email, it is unlikely that there is a response-time pattern that could lead to a possible bias. In a check that excludes late respondents, Hoffmann et al. (2013b) show that response timing is indeed not a concern. In particular, compared to quantitative measures, qualitative measures are often better predictors of individual preferences among options with unknown outcomes (Windschitl and Wells 1996) and individuals' actual investment behaviors (Weber, Weber, and Nosic 2013) .
Survey Data

Survey Design and Data Collection
[ Table 3 here]
Beliefs and Preferences
Return expectations depict investors' optimism about the returns of their investments and are measured in a similar way to that of Weber et al.'s (2013) qualitative measure. Risk perceptions gauge investors' interpretations of the riskiness of their investments and are measured as in Pennings and Wansink (2004) . Risk tolerance reflects investors' predisposition (like or dislike) toward financial risk and is measured consistent with Pennings and Smidts (2000) . To ensure that we measure investors' beliefs and preferences reliably, we use multiple items (i.e., survey questions) per variable, include these items in the questionnaire in a random order, and mix regular-and reverse-scored items (Netemeyer, Bearden, and Sharma 2003) . After rescaling reverse-scored items, we compute the final survey measures by averaging their respective item scores.
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To examine each variable's reliability, we calculate Cronbach's alpha (Cronbach 1951 ).
Cronbach's alpha indicates the degree of interrelatedness among a set of items (i.e., survey questions) that measure a particular variable (e.g., return expectations). For a variable to be called reliable, Cronbach's alpha should be above 0.7 (Hair et al. 1998) . Our measurements are reliable, as Cronbach's alpha ranges between 0.71 and 0.89 for the beliefs and preferences variables. The individual items within each survey measure thus pick up similar information.
The survey measures are cross-validated: Levels and changes in beliefs and preferences predict actual trading and risk-taking decisions (see Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings 2013a; 2013b) . Finally, robustness checks in Hoffmann and Post (2012) show that most investors in the sample remember the sign of their portfolio returns correctly. Thus, the investors in the sample are aware of the returns they have experienced in their own portfolios.
Confidence
We measure confidence with qualitative survey items (Walther (2013) follows a similar approach). After each of the survey items for return expectations, we ask investors, "How confident are you about this answer?" (Table 3 Graphically, there appears to be a negative co-movement between return expectations and confidence. The correlation between the two measures, however, is close to zero (Pearson correlation coefficient = -0.010, p-value = 0.427). That is, the confidence measure does not simply pick up return-expectation information (see related robustness checks in Section 5.2).
Our confidence measure describes a feeling which reflects that an investor constructed a coherent story in his or her mind (see Section 2). As such, it indicates investors' reliance on quick intuitive shortcuts when forming expectations about returns. Previous literature uses numerous measures of investor confidence (Moore and Healy 2008) , the most important of which are overestimation (the tendency to expect higher returns than granted by the facts), overplacement (the tendency to believe that one will perform better than the average investor), and overprecision (the tendency to have confidence intervals that are too narrow, also called miscalibration). Tests in Section 5.2 show that, in terms of predicted investor beliefs and behavior, our confidence measure has the greatest overlap with overprecision confidence.
Consistent with previous studies ( 
Results
Stability of Confidence over Time (H 1 )
In this section we test hypothesis H 1 , which conjectures that investor confidence is related to a certain type of individual (relying more or less on intuition), and thus is stable over time.
First, we examine how the cross-sectional mean of confidence changes over time. Confidence varies from month-to-month, but not by large numbers, and in most cases not significantly.
The average of the 11 monthly absolute changes of confidence (measured on a scale from 1 to 7) is 0.1. Of the 11 changes, one is significant at the 1% level (August-September 2008 Table 4 here]
Stronger Reliance of Confident Investors on Naïve Reinforcement Learning (H 2 )
Next, we test whether more confident investors rely more on naïve reinforcement learning.
That is, we examine whether compared to less confident investors, more confident investors extrapolate return experiences more strongly when updating their return expectations (H 2 ).
We run three panel regressions with the change in return expectations from the end of the previous month to the end of the current month as the dependent variable. We include Table 5 ).
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[ Table 5 here]
In the first column of when we regress levels of beliefs on investor confidence in an individual fixed-effects model as a third alternative set-up, the confidence and confidence return interaction terms are not significant (results available on request).
7 Because we do not include the trading indicators D_Trade and Turnover as control variables (because of their relation to confidence), the coefficient on past return is slightly different than that in Hoffmann and Post (2012) .
Confident Investors Change Their Return Expectations More Strongly (H 3 )
Next, we analyze the link between confidence and absolute (non-directional) changes in beliefs. That is, we test hypothesis H 3 , which predicts that more confident investors change their beliefs more strongly. Figure 5 plots the average of the absolute values of the changes in return expectations against previous month's confidence deciles. The figure suggests that investor confidence is positively related to the absolute magnitude of updates in beliefs.
[ Figure 5 here]
Next, we test the significance of the relation of confidence and the absolute magnitudes of updates of return expectation (= ABS[Return Expectation t -Return Expectation t-1 ]), using panel regressions with the same set of explanatory variable as those used in Section 4.2, but without including past return. That is, after having established the return-confidence-belief update link in Section 4.2, we now estimate the direct impact of investor confidence on the absolute magnitude of changes in their beliefs.
[ Table 6 here] variables. That is, we examine the link between trading activity in a particular month and the magnitude of the absolute value of the update in return expectations over the preceding period.
[ Table 7 here]
The results in Table 7 (left column) are consistent with the evidence in Hoffmann et al. (2013a; 2013b) and support hypothesis H 4 : Investors who change their beliefs (return expectations) more strongly have higher turnover in the subsequent period. That is, stronger changes in beliefs provide more reason to trade. This result also holds when we control for investors' risk tolerance and risk perception (right column), ruling out the possibility that the effect of confidence on trading would not work through more confident investors' stronger updates in beliefs, but through risk tolerance and risk perception, which might relate to confidence and intuitive judgments (Dorn and Huberman 2005; Butler, Guiso, and Jappelli 2011a; 2011b) .
Finally, Table 8 presents statistics on heterogeneity in investors' return experiences, changes in return expectations, and absolute changes in return expectations. These statistics highlight that within the cross-section of investors in each month, there is substantial variation in the magnitude of returns, the sign of returns achieved (positive or negative), the magnitude and direction of changes in return expectations, and the magnitude of absolute changes in return expectations. That is, next to changes in beliefs as one precondition of trading, we observe the second precondition for trading in the sample: There is substantial heterogeneity in the magnitude and direction of changes in beliefs. That is, there are differences in beliefs and changes in those differences (Varian 1989; Harris and Raviv 1993; Banerjee 2011) . Investors with reasons to trade will thus be able to find a trading counterpart.
Moreover, even if, occasionally, individual investors' changes in beliefs (and thus behavior) might be highly correlated, there is empirical evidence about rational traders in the market that absorb individual investor demand and supply. For example, firms tend to issue equity when stock markets perform well (Baker and Wurgler 2000; Schultz 2003; Wurgler 2009), thus absorbing correlated demand from individual investors.
[ Table 8 here]
Robustness Checks
Rationality of Reliance on Naïve Reinforcement Learning
Our theoretical framework links investors' expectation formation to confidence, in that more confident investors rely more on naïve reinforcement learning, and thus extrapolate recent return experiences more strongly than less confident investors. Based on the same data, Hoffmann and Post (2012) show that, on average, extrapolating recent return experiences when forming return expectations is not rational in that it is associated with higher returns.
The return-generating process in the sample does not exhibit predictability or momentum, and return expectations do not contain information on investors' skill or subsequent performance. Investor confidence, however, might contain previously omitted information that is indeed related to depicting superior trading skill, so that it would be rational for more confident investors to extrapolate recent return experience more strongly compared to less confident investors. To examine this possibility, we regress investor returns on past return expectations, past confidence, and an interaction term for past return expectations with investor confidence. Table 9 shows that neither past return expectations alone (first column), nor investor confidence and its interaction with return expectations (second column) are significantly related to investor returns. That is, investor confidence does not correlate with superior skills.
If we exclude from the model variables that are related to investor confidence, that is, return expectations (related to confidence when forming beliefs) and trading indicators (related to confidence as more confidence triggers more trades through more strongly changing beliefs), investor confidence has a significant and negative effect on investor returns (third column).
To conclude, it is not rational for more confident investors to extrapolate recent return experiences into the future more strongly. If anything, these investors' more strongly changing beliefs hurt their performance through higher turnover. Evaluating alternative performance measures (Sharpe Ratio, One-Factor Alpha) yield consistent evidence (available on request).
[ Table 9 here]
Survey Measures: Reliability and Validity
To measure investors' return expectations, we use survey items that have already been used and cross-validated in previous studies (Hoffmann, Post, and Pennings 2013a; 2013b) . In the context of the present study, however, the third survey item of the return expectation measure Table 5 ), the coefficient on confidence in the absolute changes in return expectation regression is positive (0.102) and significant (p-value = 0.000) (compare Table 6 ), and the coefficient on the lagged absolute changes in return expectations in the turnover regression is positive (0.086) and significant (p-value = 0.003) (compare Table 7 ).
In our theoretical framework, we link investor confidence with reliance on intuition and use of heuristics, as suggested by Kahneman (2011: 212, 217 tolerance. To check for this possibility, we regress the absolute changes in risk perception or risk tolerance on past confidence with the same set of control variables as those used in the return expectation regression in Section 4.3. We find a significant and positive impact of confidence on the magnitude of changes for both risk perceptions and risk tolerance. The coefficient for confidence in the risk perception regression is 0.092 (p-value 0.000) and in the risk tolerance regression it is 0.090 (p-value 0.000) (compare return expectation results in Table 6 ). Thus, although confidence is measured with respect to return expectations, it seems to reflect something more general as it interacts in a consistent way with the updating process of risk perceptions and risk tolerance.
In general, the confidence measures used in previous work are usually elicited by numerical survey questions (prediction tasks) (see e.g., Glaser and Weber 2007 ). Because we do not have corresponding questions in our survey, we cannot identify precisely if and to which of the previously used confidence measures our measure is most closely related. Based on the predictions of the effect of confidence on beliefs and behavior that differ between the three types of confidence, however, we can check to see with which measure our measure overlaps most closely. In particular, overestimation confidence predicts that return expectations are higher for more confident investors without being justified by higher returns.
Overplacement confidence predicts that investors with high confidence expect to achieve higher returns relative to other investors. Overprecision (i.e., miscalibration) confidence predicts that investors with more confidence hold riskier portfolios than those that would be granted by their beliefs (return expectations, risk perception) and preferences (risk tolerance).
We can test these predictions with the data available. First, we can rule out overestimation confidence because of the zero correlation reported in Section 3.2.3 between return expectations and confidence, and the fact that more confident investors do not achieve higher returns (see robustness checks in Section 5.1). Second, with respect to overplacement, we can exploit survey item number three for return expectations (compare Table 3 ), which reads "Next month, my investments will have a worse performance than those of most other investors." If our confidence measure is related to overplacement, then the correlation of confidence with this return-expectation item should be positive (as it is a reverse-scored item). The correlation of the third return-expectation item with our confidence measure is 0.080 (p-value 0.000). 10 Although the correlation is not large, this result is generally consistent with overplacement confidence. To check for overprecision confidence, we regress investor portfolio risk (standard deviation) on lagged confidence, while controlling for lagged beliefs (return expectations, risk perception) and preferences (risk tolerance), and the set of controls discussed in Section 4.1. Results in Table 10 show that our confidence measure is significantly related to higher portfolio risk, even after controlling for investor beliefs and preferences. This evidence is consistent with predictions from overprecision confidence.
[ Table 10 here]
Thus, based on these results, we cannot discriminate between overplacement and overprecision confidence. We do have data from a 2006 survey with the same broker, however, where investors were asked to rate their competence as investors by selfcategorizing as a "novice investor," "advanced investor," or "very advanced investor" (see Hoffmann and Shefrin (2013) for details on this survey). Based on the results of Graham et al. (2009) , investor perceived competence is positively related to overplacement confidence.
Thus, if our measure relates to overplacement rather than overprecision, we expect a positive relationship between confidence and self-rated competence. Matching survey respondents of the 2006 survey with current-survey respondents yields 245 investors for whom we have information on both self-categorized competence and confidence. In this subset of the data, average confidence for the investors does not increase with competence. The average of confidence is 5.50 for the "novice" group, 5.31 for the "advanced" group, and 5.44 for the "very advanced" group. Differences between the groups are not statistically significant.
Based on the test results, we conclude that behavioral effects of our confidence measure overlap the most with predictions of overprecision confidence. In consequence, the direct overprecision-trading links found in prior empirical literature (see e.g., Deaves, Lüders, and Luo 2009) may stem from the mechanism identified in this paper and not the theoretical mechanism proposed in Odean (1998) . Alternatively, both mechanisms may be linking overconfidence and trading simultaneously. In any case, the overlap of our measure with the third item with the third return expectation item. In both cases we have correlations of similar magnitude (0.083 or 0.073), that are both significant (p-value 0.000).
predictions from overprecision suggest that both confidence dimensions potentially have their roots in the same mental processes, like reliance on intuition and System 1 activation.
A final potential concern with respect to the quality of the survey measures is that they are measured on a Likert scale that ranges from 1 to 7. Thus, investors that have responses at or close to the scales' upper or lower limit in a certain month might not be able to express updates in their return expectations for the next month or confidence therein appropriately.
Hence, to test the robustness of the results, we exclude all observations for a particular month where return expectations or confidence values are smaller than 2 or larger than 6 in the respective previous month and estimate the models of Section 4 again on the resulting subsample. The results confirm the findings of Section 4: Within investors, confidence is stable over time, while more confident investors rely more on naïve reinforcement learning and exhibit larger absolute updates of their return expectations (detailed results available upon request).
Conclusion and Discussion
Although it is well-known that more confident investors trade more, much less is known about the actual mechanism that links investor confidence to trading. Previous research proposes several such mechanisms, but does not test them empirically. More confident investors, for example, would believe more strongly in their private signals and/or overweight these signals when updating their investment beliefs (Odean 1998) . The resulting divergence of opinion would lead to more trading. More confident investors also would be more willing to act on their personal beliefs (Graham, Harvey, and Huang 2009; Deaves, Lüders, and Luo 2009 ). The literature, however, mostly tests the ultimate relation between investor confidence and trading, but not the intermediate stages explaining why confidence leads to more trading.
We complement the literature on investor confidence by developing a theory and presenting empirical evidence on a mechanism through which confidence leads to trading.
Our theoretical framework relies on well-established findings from prior literature, while providing an innovation by including an "experience-confidence-belief" intermediate link. Monthly investor return given by the product of the daily relative changes in the value of his or her portfolio after transaction costs and portfolio in-and outflows. For example, a monthly return of 10% takes the value 0.1 in the data. Std(Return)
Investor-specific standard deviation of daily portfolio returns in a particular month (in monthly terms).
Return Expectation
Reflects how optimistic a respondent is about his or her investment portfolio and its returns in the upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 .
Risk Tolerance
Reflects a respondent's general predisposition toward financial risk. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 .
Risk Perception
Reflects a respondent's interpretation of how risky the stock market will be in the upcoming month. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 . Confidence Reflects a respondent's confidence about the response to the return expectation question. Details on the survey questions are given in Table 3 .
Because of data availability, the data retrieved from Statistics Netherlands refer to different years, that is, to 2007 for income and to 2008 for house value. mean 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20,242 20 mean 20, 181 20, 088 20, 109 19, 978 20, 085 20, 002 20, 147 19, 892 19, 859 20, 046 20, 034 20, 028 std 4, 285 3, 956 4, 240 3, 729 3, 835 4, 153 4, 197 3, 808 3, 543 3, 897 3, 844 3, 860 Portfolio Value € mean 54, 446 54, 264 45, 411 45, 509 49, 557 39, 707 29, 490 33, 660 30, 169 30, 693 27, 444 27, 229 std 143, 872 144, 617 128, 455 128, 159 124, 176 105, 507 100, 216 118, 529 66, 600 66, 198 53, 089 55, 039 House Value € mean 276, 690 272, 969 272, 038 273, 559 274, 221 274, 736 277, 543 272, 429 272, 020 273, 443 277, 193 This table presents monthly summary statistics for the brokerage account data. Panel A refers to all investors for whom brokerage records are available. This sample includes investors who participated at least once in the survey during the sample period, and who were not excluded by the sample-selection restrictions defined in Section 3. The monthly summary statistics presented in Panel B refer to the subset of investors who responded to the survey in each respective month. Variables are defined in Table 1 . Return Expectation (1 = low/pessimistic, 7 = high/optimistic)
Next month, I expect my investments to do less well than desired. 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) For the next month, I have a positive feeling about my financial future.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Next month, my investments will have a worse performance than those of most other investors.
(totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Next month, it is unlikely that my investment behavior will lead to positive returns.
For the next month, the future of my investment portfolio looks good.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Risk Tolerance (1 = low risk tolerance, 7 = high risk tolerance)
Next month, I prefer certainty over uncertainty when investing.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Next month, I avoid risks when investing.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Next month, I do not like to take financial risks.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) Next month, I do not like to "play it safe" when investing.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Risk Perception (1 = low perceived risk, 7 = high perceived risk)
I consider investing to be very risky next month.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) I consider investing to be safe next month.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) I consider investing to be dangerous next month.* 1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree) I consider investing to have little risk next month.
1 (totally agree)-7 (totally disagree)
Confidence (1 = low confidence, 7 = high confidence)
How confident are you about this answer? † 1 (not confident at all)-7 (very confident)
38 This table presents transition probabilities for an investor moving from a particular decile in the distribution of confidence at the end of the previous month to a decile in the corresponding distribution at the end of the current month. The confidence measure is defined in Table 1. 39 Table 1 . *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 . *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 . *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 1 . *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Table 3 ). A small value indicates low confidence, whereas a large value indicates high confidence. Mean return expectation Mean confidence 95% confidence interval Table 3 ). A small value indicates low return expectations or confidence, whereas a large value indicates high return expectations or confidence. 48 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 0 2 4 6 8 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 May08 Jun08 Jul08 Aug08 Sep08 Oct08 Nov08 Dec08 Jan09 Feb09 Mar09
Confidence Decile Previous Month Table 3 ). A small value indicates low confidence, whereas a large value indicates high confidence. Table 3 ). A small value indicates low return expectation or confidence, whereas a large value indicates high return expectation or confidence.
